Don’t let the tax bogey affect your mutual fund investments

It’s official. The Finance Ministry has clarified its stance on taxation for non-equity mutual funds regarding the ‘retrospective’ aspect. Also, it is evident that there will be no rollback in other proposals; Finance Bill 2014 has been passed by the Lok Sabha and is now awaiting a nod from the Rajya Sabha. For all intents and purposes, fixed maturity plans (FMPs) have lost the tax advantage they enjoyed over fixed deposits (FDs), and now debt fund investors must have an investment horizon of at least 36 months if they wish to reap tax benefits on long-term capital gains.   

An interesting outcome of this development has been in the form of investment advice. Experts are falling over each other trying to determine which investment avenue is best suited for individuals in specific tax brackets. For instance, statements such as “if you are in the lowest tax bracket then FDs make sense, however for those in the highest tax bracket, long-term debt funds will be the best bet” have become commonplace. Fund houses seem to have been caught up in the frenzy as well. Media reports suggest that some of them are trying to extend/roll over one-year FMPs for a further 24-month period so that investments therein will become eligible for long-term capital gains.

The trouble with this tax-focused muddle is that it contravenes the basic principles of investing. Don’t get me wrong—I’m not suggesting that tax implications should be ignored; however, they certainly shouldn't be the primary basis for making an investment. For instance, a fundamental difference between FDs and debt funds (including FMPs) is that the former offer safety of capital and assured returns, while the latter are market-linked investments i.e. the capital invested is at risk, and there are no assured returns. It is imperative that investors first get a fix on what their risk profile is, and accordingly pick an investment avenue, rather than start off by evaluating which avenue is more tax-efficient.

Likewise, the investment horizon is no less important. Consider a scenario wherein an investor in the highest tax bracket has surplus monies to put away for 18 months. It would not be prudent to invest in a 3-year FMP only because the taxation thereon is more liberal versus that on an 18-month FD. Simply put, investors must focus on aspects such as risk profile and investment horizon, before considering the investment’s tax-efficiency. Failing to do so could result in investors deploying monies in avenues unsuitable for them, and for inapt tenures as well.   

Arbitrage funds to the rescue…

If the aforementioned experts are to be believed, debt funds have lost their appeal for good, and now investors should focus on a new silver bullet—arbitrage funds. Sadly that argument is both preposterous and flawed.

Arbitrage funds operate on the premise of exploiting mispricing opportunities between the cash and derivatives markets. They thrive on market volatility. At its core, it is a straitjacketed approach since it will only deliver in certain market conditions. Furthermore, unlike debt funds which invest in fixed income securities, arbitrage funds operate in the domain of equities—so much for their likeness. If you are wondering why arbitrage funds exist in the first place—the answer is herd mentality. In the NFO-driven era of 2005-06 when a couple of fund houses launched arbitrage funds, others followed suit lest they be left behind. Like most NFOs, the launch of arbitrage funds had little to do with conviction in investment merit.  

So why have arbitrage emerged as the season’s flavour? Because they are treated as equity funds for taxation (read liberal tax rates and provisions) while plying a market-neutral strategy. On their part, investors would do well to steer clear of experts who profess that arbitrage funds make apt replacements for debt funds. 

Admittedly, a higher tax liability on debt fund investments is taxing both literally and figuratively. But trying to circumvent it by investing in unsuitable avenues will only make matters worse. The solution lies in coming to terms with the new scenario and staying the course.

Should SEBI be so concerned about size?

Admittedly, “does size matter?” is one of the more tricky questions to answer. Depending on where and when that question is posed, it could evoke different responses from the same individual.

However (and on a more serious note), market regulator SEBI seems to have an unambiguous view on the subject. It is seemingly convinced that bigger is indeed better. Not too long ago, it mandated that the minimum net worth of asset management companies (AMCs) be increased to Rs 500 million (from the erstwhile minimum of Rs 100 million). If recent media reports are to be believed, SEBI has written to AMCs asking them to merge or close debt funds with an asset size of less than Rs 200 million. Reports further suggest that equity funds with an asset size of less than Rs 100 million will be dealt with likewise.

Yet again SEBI seems convinced that investors’ interests will be better served by investing in larger funds. To be fair, larger funds offer certain advantages: all things being equal, they are structured to be more competitive on the price (read expense ratio) front versus smaller sized funds. In certain segments of the debt market, the minimum lot size is on the higher side, in turn necessitating that the fund have a reasonable asset size to be able to operate efficiently.    

But doesn’t it strike as being odd that the market regulator is now even dictating what a fund’s minimum asset size should be? Clearly, there’s more to it than meets the eye. For some time now, SEBI has been trying to make mutual fund investing less complicated for investors. Remember the risk-based colour-coding for funds, or even asking AMCs to disclose fund performance versus an appropriate benchmark index across specified time periods. To my mind, SEBI recognizes that there are too many funds available out there which makes fund selection a difficult task for investors. With this move, SEBI is in fact trying to rationalize the number of funds.

In India, AMCs have displayed a penchant for recklessly launching new fund offers (NFOs), since NFOs do act as tools of asset mobilisation. In this context, while the regulator’s intent cannot be flawed, the approach needs to be questioned. A fund’s asset size in isolation cannot be the barometer of its worthiness. Just as there are several small funds which perform and serve investors well, there are several large ones which are laggards and hurt investors’ interests.

Disallowing smaller funds en masse hardly seems like the right solution. Instead what the regulator must do is force (since they seem incapable of doing so voluntarily) accountability on AMCs. And here’s how:

1.   Make AMCs invest in all their open-ended funds:   

Extend the scope of the recent regulation whereby the concept of seed capital in open-ended NFOs has been introduced to all open-ended funds. Simply put, it should be mandatory for AMCs to invest their personal monies in all their open-ended funds. Apart from boosting the fund’s asset size, this move will (more importantly) also reveal an AMC’s true commitment to its funds. It should come as no surprise if a number of funds are voluntarily closed or merged irrespective of their asset size.

2.   Make the Board of Trustees accountable

The Board of Trustees (BoT) is required to sign off on NFOs authenticating that they are different from the AMC’s existing funds. Truth be told, not all boards have distinguished themselves, else we wouldn’t have had a proliferation of like NFOs. It’s time SEBI makes the BoT accountable by getting them to audit all existing funds on an ongoing basis with a view to weed out both weak and similar funds. The audit report, recommendations made and action taken should be a part of the annual statutory disclosure.

3.   Enhance quality of distributors

This is admittedly a long-term initiative: the Indian mutual fund industry needs more informed and better-equipped distributors. Sadly, there are a large number of well-meaning distributors who would like to do what’s right for the investor, but are ill-equipped to do so. For instance, when an AMC offers them a fund with a poor investment proposition, they are unable to see through it. The answer lies in re-visiting the criteria for empanelling distributors. Also, SEBI should mandate that a part of the monies meant for ‘investor education’ initiatives (we all know how that is really utilised J) be used for training distributors.

Finally, the market regulator must recognize that if it wishes to attract investors and build investor confidence, there is a need to make systemic changes in the mutual fund industry. Targeting smaller sized funds is unlikely to help on either count.

What happened to close-ended funds?

Circa 2006-07, close-ended funds were the season's flavour. Fund houses were busy convincing investors to get invested on the premise that close-ended funds furthered the cause of 'long-term' investing. Investors had a plethora of options to chose from since close-ended NFOs (new fund offers) of every conceivable kind were launched i.e. mid-cap, flexi-cap, thematic, fund of funds and tax-saving.

The genesis of close-ended funds
When equity markets hit a purple patch in 2003, fund houses capitalised on the same by launching equity fund NFOs. Most NFOs were of the open-ended variety. Fund houses were permitted to charge initial issue expenses (6% of corpus) to the fund and amortise the same over a period time. Initial issue expenses were largely used to meet marketing and distribution expenses. As a result, distributors were handsomely rewarded for their efforts in asset mobilisation.

A spanner in the works came in the form of a SEBI guideline that scrapped initial issue expenses on open-ended NFOs. Now, fund houses were required to meet NFO-related marketing and distribution expenses from the entry load; the norm was 2.25% of the sum invested. But close-ended NFOs were out of the purview of this ruling. While fund houses were permitted to charge initial issue expenses on close-ended NFOs, the trade-off was that they were prohibited from levying an entry load. The choice between initial issue expenses and entry load was a no-brainer. The result was a deluge of close-ended NFOs.

It would be unfair to paint all fund houses and close-ended NFOs with the same brush. Some close-ended NFOs did offer a truly innovative investment proposition. However, ignoring the marketing aspect would be naive.

The present scenario
It can be safely stated that close-ended funds are a forgotten breed now. Maybe, it had something to do with a subsequent guideline (January 2008), wherein SEBI decided that close-ended NFOs be treated on par with open-ended NFOs i.e. they would be permitted to charge an entry load and the provision to charge initial issue expenses was scrapped.

While close-ended funds may not feature on the priority lists of fund houses, it's a different scenario for investors. Several investors got invested in close-ended NFOs and continue to hold the same in their portfolios. Also, since then, markets have had quite a journey - an ascent to record highs, followed by a sharp downturn, and a recovery of sorts. It would be interesting to study how close-ended funds have fared so far.

The performance
Of the several close-ended funds launched in the 2006-08 period, 4 have a 3-Yr track record now. The following table shows how they have fared vis-à-vis comparable open-ended offerings from the same fund house and their respective benchmark indices.

	3-Yr (%)
Franklin India Prima	8.2
Franklin India Smaller Companies ©	6.6
CNX Midcap	16.8
HDFC Premier Multi-Cap	14.1
HDFC Long-term Equity ©	9.1
S&P CNX Nifty	15.2
ICICI Prudential Dynamic	18.2
ICICI Prudential Fusion ©	6.5
CNX Nifty Junior	18.7
Tata Tax Saving	12.6
Tata Tax Advantage 1 ©	14.3
BSE Sensex	14.6

(NAV and index data as on July 24, 2009. © indicates close-ended fund. NAV data sourced from www.amfiindia.com. Index data sourced from www.bseindia.com and www.nseindia.com. All data in CAGR terms)

As can be seen in the table above, close-ended funds have failed to match their benchmark indices over the 3-Yr period. Furthermore, with the exception of one fund, others have failed to match comparable open-ended funds from the same fund house. Even a cursory glance at performance of other close-ended funds (ones that have been in existence for less than 3-Yrs) will reveal that largely their performance is nothing to write home about.

It ain't over, till it's over
Critics might argue that the aforementioned funds need not be a representative sample of the entire close-ended funds category. Fair enough. But few would dispute that close-ended funds have failed to impress so far.

Fund houses are likely to justify the mediocre showing posted by close-ended funds on the grounds that these are early days. Given that most close-ended funds have a 5-Yr tenure, passing any judgement at this stage would be premature. Also, several funds have a provision for conversion into open-ended funds on maturity. Hence, should they fail to deliver in their close-ended avtaar, investors can continue to stay invested and exit the same at a more opportune time. While there might be some merit in the former argument (early days for funds), the latter certainly doesn't hold good.

Here's why - investments in close-ended funds were made on the premise that they would enable fund managers to make long-term investment decisions i.e. fund managers would not be weighed down by factors like redemption pressure and short-term market occurrences, that typically plague open-ended funds. When investors agreed to forsake liquidity (make a 5-Yr commitment) and bear initial issue expenses, the trade-off should have been a superlative performance. The least investors would expect is for close-ended funds to deliver a better showing than open-ended funds. And should close-ended funds fail to deliver, investors have every right to feel aggrieved.

What investors must do
Investors would do well to appreciate that not every promising proposition translates into a sound investment avenue. On paper, a close-ended fund with a defined maturity horizon and corpus sounds like an interesting idea; however, with the benefit of hindsight, it can be safely concluded that not every close-ended fund will live up to the promise. This underscores the importance of seeking diversification and a track record while making investment decisions.

Also, investors must keep track of their close-ended fund investments. Be patient and give them adequate time to prove themselves. Despite this, if they fail to deliver, don't hesitate to exit them after taking into account factors like the exit load. Perhaps an alternative fund with a similar investment proposition might be a better bet.

Look who's talking!

Mutual funds are back with a bang! Pick up any newspaper and you are bound to come across a mutual fund related write-up or advertisement. Given the surge in equity markets, the performance of mutual funds has started looking up. And fund houses are sparing no effort (explicit or implicit) to spread the gospel of mutual funds. There are articles eulogising the impressive showing delivered by mutual funds in the recent past; also, the fact that the mutual fund industry now holds a record assets under management (AUM) size has been well-documented. Fund managers are busy giving out interviews highlighting how mutual funds will hold investors in good stead over the long-term. Dividends are being declared in a hurry by several funds to prove their prowess. Finally, some new fund offers (NFOs) have already been launched (more on this later in the article) and several others are on the way. All in all, it can be safely stated that mutual funds are back with a bang!

Circa October 2008
Not too long ago (October 2008 to be precise), the scenario was radically different. Equity funds had been hit hard by the sharp decline in equity markets; even 3-Yr performance numbers were in negative territory. Debt offerings like fixed maturity plans (FMPs) and liquid/liquid plus funds had come under the scanner on account of the liquidity crisis; questions were being raised about the quality of investments made by several funds. Simply put, mutual funds had become everyone's favourite 'whipping boys'. While all the criticism may not have been justified, some of it certainly was.

Interestingly, the response of fund houses to the demanding situation was rather curious. Most fund houses went into a 'silent' mode and simply chose not to react. When relationship managers were contacted for information about their funds, the standard response was, "everything is fine; there is nothing to worry about". Requests for one-on-one interviews with fund managers were either instantly turned down on the grounds that the fund manager was busy or stalled with the excuse - "we'll get back to you on this one". While some fund houses/fund managers were willing to go on record about the nature and quality of their fund portfolios, they were strictly in a minority.

Odd isn't it. In a time of crisis, fund houses, instead of communicating with investors to assuage their concerns, chose to go into hiding. And now, when the going is good, fund houses are acting like 10-yr old over-energetic blabbermouths who can't keep mum. That tells you something about fund houses, doesn't it?

As for the NFOs, at any sign of rising markets and a revival in investor interest, they make a comeback. Already, we have had a round of the 'target return' NFOs. Simply put, these are funds wherein there is an inbuilt clause for booking profits when a certain return (as specified by the investor) is clocked. In most cases, the profits are booked and invested in a debt fund from the same fund house. For investors who were ruing the fact that they didn't book profits when markets peaked in January 2008, only to see the value of their investments plummet subsequently, these NFOs struck a chord.

Here's a thought - is it prudent for mutual funds to book profits for investors or is that something investors should be independently dealing with after taking into account factors like their individual financial goals, the investment scenario and the performance of their investment portfolio as a whole. Also, let's not forget that regularly 'booking profits' for every individual investor at a fund level, just might force the fund manager to prematurely sell some quality stocks from his portfolio. This in turn, could be detrimental to the long-term interests of the fund.

But given the receptiveness shown by investors, fund houses were only more than happy to launch a slew of 'target return' funds. Some introduced the facility to book profits in their existing funds. Of course, the fact that even after booking profits, (on account of transfer of profits booked into a debt fund) there is no fall in the AUM of the fund house doesn't hurt the latter's cause. Rest assured, with the markets moving northwards at a brisk pace, it's only a matter of time before a number of NFOs hit the markets.

What investors must do
Given that fund houses have failed to distinguish themselves, it is fair to state that investors would do well not to blindly follow them while making investment decisions. Going forward, fund houses will try to entice investors by making them believe that all is hunky dory and now is the time to get invested lock, stock and barrel. Can't blame them, it's the AUM that translates into income for them. Hence, higher the AUM i.e. more investments made by investors, the better it is for fund houses.

On the other hand, investors need to be a lot more pragmatic. They should not get carried away by all the hype being whipped up by fund houses. Instead, they should use the downturn and despondency that they witnessed and experienced not too long ago, to make a fair evaluation of their risk-taking ability. This can help them determine what portion of the investment portfolio should be allocated to mutual funds. While no one would dispute the ability of well-managed mutual funds to add value to investors' portfolios, there is certainly a need to guard against making investments in a reckless manner.