Debt Funds: Liquidity Matters, But Managing Liquidity Is The Key

Recently, I read an article written by an individual who is considered an expert on mutual funds. Weighing in on the ongoing debate of debt funds taking credit risk, he came up with an interesting solution--modify the structure of funds investing in illiquid securities, whereby redemption requests don’t have to be met immediately. The rationale being: the combination of investments in illiquid securities and an immediate redemption facility is at the root of the crisis. Hence the solution lies in permitting fund houses to make delayed redemptions. 

On the face of it, the recommendation seems reasonable. But scratch the surface, and the solution will appear simplistic. Here’s why:

To begin with, in a mutual fund, a portfolio manager’s role is not restricted to just identifying lucrative investment opportunities, and making timely investments. His ability to proficiently managing liquidity in the portfolio is no less important. Skilled portfolio construction can enable a manager to navigate unexpected market events (and handle redemption pressure) without unsettling the portfolio, or with minimum disruption to the portfolio. In other words, the presence of illiquid corporate debt in the portfolio need not make the portfolio illiquid. Indeed, liquidity management is one of the parameters on which the manager and his investment process must be evaluated. It is inexcusable for a manager to compromise the portfolio’s liquidity in a bid to clock higher returns. To my mind, such a scenario portrays the manager’s investment skills in poor light.

Furthermore, defining what constitutes a liquid investment is easier said than done. For instance, to suggest that only corporate bonds are illiquid wouldn’t be accurate. A cursory glance at data for trades in the benchmark 10-year GOI bond versus those for other GOI bonds reveals a telling picture. Market conditions and sentiment can significantly impact liquidity. In buoyant markets, the corporate debt segment can be more liquid than in a downturn. A parallel can be drawn for equity markets as well, wherein small/mid-caps typically tend to be more liquid during an upturn. Clearly, defining which funds invest in illiquid instruments (as has been suggested in the article) is more complicated than it has been made out to be.

Finally, there’s a need to discuss where the onus must lie: should investors be asked to tone down their expectations on the liquidity front, or should fund houses be responsible for performing better on the liquidity management front? 

In many ways, the financial crisis of 2008 proved seminal for the Indian mutual fund industry. Several debt funds (including close-ended products such as fixed maturity plans) witnessed extraordinary redemption pressure. Subsequently, SEBI put safeguards in place by prohibiting fund houses from providing premature redemption for close-ended funds and defining the investment profile for liquid funds, among others. Some fund houses and managers went back to the drawing board and re-evaluated their investment philosophy, especially for the debt funds segment. In turn, this equipped them to better manage liquidity in their portfolios. 

Present regulations governing redemptions are not only comprehensive, but reasonably indicative of how investments should be made. Hence, there is no valid reason for creating a third structure (a middle ground between open- and close-ended funds) to make up for a fund house/manager’s incompetence. As for fund houses which can’t make the grade, the ‘perform or perish’ maxim is apt. 

What happened to close-ended funds?

Circa 2006-07, close-ended funds were the season's flavour. Fund houses were busy convincing investors to get invested on the premise that close-ended funds furthered the cause of 'long-term' investing. Investors had a plethora of options to chose from since close-ended NFOs (new fund offers) of every conceivable kind were launched i.e. mid-cap, flexi-cap, thematic, fund of funds and tax-saving.

The genesis of close-ended funds
When equity markets hit a purple patch in 2003, fund houses capitalised on the same by launching equity fund NFOs. Most NFOs were of the open-ended variety. Fund houses were permitted to charge initial issue expenses (6% of corpus) to the fund and amortise the same over a period time. Initial issue expenses were largely used to meet marketing and distribution expenses. As a result, distributors were handsomely rewarded for their efforts in asset mobilisation.

A spanner in the works came in the form of a SEBI guideline that scrapped initial issue expenses on open-ended NFOs. Now, fund houses were required to meet NFO-related marketing and distribution expenses from the entry load; the norm was 2.25% of the sum invested. But close-ended NFOs were out of the purview of this ruling. While fund houses were permitted to charge initial issue expenses on close-ended NFOs, the trade-off was that they were prohibited from levying an entry load. The choice between initial issue expenses and entry load was a no-brainer. The result was a deluge of close-ended NFOs.

It would be unfair to paint all fund houses and close-ended NFOs with the same brush. Some close-ended NFOs did offer a truly innovative investment proposition. However, ignoring the marketing aspect would be naive.

The present scenario
It can be safely stated that close-ended funds are a forgotten breed now. Maybe, it had something to do with a subsequent guideline (January 2008), wherein SEBI decided that close-ended NFOs be treated on par with open-ended NFOs i.e. they would be permitted to charge an entry load and the provision to charge initial issue expenses was scrapped.

While close-ended funds may not feature on the priority lists of fund houses, it's a different scenario for investors. Several investors got invested in close-ended NFOs and continue to hold the same in their portfolios. Also, since then, markets have had quite a journey - an ascent to record highs, followed by a sharp downturn, and a recovery of sorts. It would be interesting to study how close-ended funds have fared so far.

The performance
Of the several close-ended funds launched in the 2006-08 period, 4 have a 3-Yr track record now. The following table shows how they have fared vis-à-vis comparable open-ended offerings from the same fund house and their respective benchmark indices.

	3-Yr (%)
Franklin India Prima	8.2
Franklin India Smaller Companies ©	6.6
CNX Midcap	16.8
HDFC Premier Multi-Cap	14.1
HDFC Long-term Equity ©	9.1
S&P CNX Nifty	15.2
ICICI Prudential Dynamic	18.2
ICICI Prudential Fusion ©	6.5
CNX Nifty Junior	18.7
Tata Tax Saving	12.6
Tata Tax Advantage 1 ©	14.3
BSE Sensex	14.6

(NAV and index data as on July 24, 2009. © indicates close-ended fund. NAV data sourced from www.amfiindia.com. Index data sourced from www.bseindia.com and www.nseindia.com. All data in CAGR terms)

As can be seen in the table above, close-ended funds have failed to match their benchmark indices over the 3-Yr period. Furthermore, with the exception of one fund, others have failed to match comparable open-ended funds from the same fund house. Even a cursory glance at performance of other close-ended funds (ones that have been in existence for less than 3-Yrs) will reveal that largely their performance is nothing to write home about.

It ain't over, till it's over
Critics might argue that the aforementioned funds need not be a representative sample of the entire close-ended funds category. Fair enough. But few would dispute that close-ended funds have failed to impress so far.

Fund houses are likely to justify the mediocre showing posted by close-ended funds on the grounds that these are early days. Given that most close-ended funds have a 5-Yr tenure, passing any judgement at this stage would be premature. Also, several funds have a provision for conversion into open-ended funds on maturity. Hence, should they fail to deliver in their close-ended avtaar, investors can continue to stay invested and exit the same at a more opportune time. While there might be some merit in the former argument (early days for funds), the latter certainly doesn't hold good.

Here's why - investments in close-ended funds were made on the premise that they would enable fund managers to make long-term investment decisions i.e. fund managers would not be weighed down by factors like redemption pressure and short-term market occurrences, that typically plague open-ended funds. When investors agreed to forsake liquidity (make a 5-Yr commitment) and bear initial issue expenses, the trade-off should have been a superlative performance. The least investors would expect is for close-ended funds to deliver a better showing than open-ended funds. And should close-ended funds fail to deliver, investors have every right to feel aggrieved.

What investors must do
Investors would do well to appreciate that not every promising proposition translates into a sound investment avenue. On paper, a close-ended fund with a defined maturity horizon and corpus sounds like an interesting idea; however, with the benefit of hindsight, it can be safely concluded that not every close-ended fund will live up to the promise. This underscores the importance of seeking diversification and a track record while making investment decisions.

Also, investors must keep track of their close-ended fund investments. Be patient and give them adequate time to prove themselves. Despite this, if they fail to deliver, don't hesitate to exit them after taking into account factors like the exit load. Perhaps an alternative fund with a similar investment proposition might be a better bet.